Introduction
This report evaluates whether U.S. border policy under the Biden administration can accurately be described as “open,” and how policy changes interacted with the sharp rise in recorded encounters. It first examines the new architecture of “lawful, safe, and orderly” pathways—CBP One, regional processing centers, and large-scale parole—alongside rules that narrowed traditional asylum access. It then analyzes enforcement trends, Title 42’s distortions, and the CHNV parole program to separate policy effects from measurement artifacts. Finally, it situates record encounters within broader economic, political, and technological forces, contrasting partisan “open border” claims with evidence of concurrent enforcement tightening.
Across the Biden administration, border and asylum policy combined three elements that sit uneasily together: historically high encounter numbers, an unprecedented expansion of “lawful pathways” into the United States, and a parallel tightening of access to asylum for those arriving irregularly. This mix produced a political narrative of “open borders” even as the legal architecture grew more restrictive in important ways.
Measured flows at the southwest border reached record levels. From January 2021 to January 2024, more than 7.2 million attempted illegal crossings were recorded, with FY 2023 encounters at roughly 2.5 million and monthly encounters peaking around 302,000 in December 2023 [1][4][5]. Some sources tally 8.6 million encounters from January 2021 to October 2024, many involving repeat crossers [1]. Conservative committees and advocacy groups cited these volumes, along with large-scale releases and backlogged courts, as evidence of deliberate “open border operations” and “lax immigration enforcement” that “un‑secured” the border and threatened public safety and sovereignty [3][4][5][8]. In this telling, high encounter and release levels were the foreseeable result of administration choices rather than exogenous pressure.
Yet these record numbers emerged in a broader structural context that weakens simple causal claims that Biden “caused” the crisis. Analyses based on government and FOIA data argue that the sharp run-up in encounters began before Biden took office and started to ebb before he left [2][5]. They highlight unusually strong U.S. labor demand—job openings at unprecedented levels—and rapidly expanding internet and social media access in origin countries as key drivers of migration, enabling smugglers and peers to provide real‑time information about routes, policies, and perceived opportunities [2]. According to this view, when labor demand cooled and more legal avenues opened, irregular flows declined [2][5]. Hemispheric instability, violence, and economic shocks further contributed to pressure that was not primarily created by U.S. policy [5].
Policy design under Biden centered on redirecting that pressure into formal channels. The administration explicitly promoted “lawful, safe, and orderly” migration, building new mechanisms that allowed large numbers of people to enter legally while tightening asylum rules for those who did not use them. A central tool was the CBP One app, which lets migrants schedule port‑of‑entry appointments for processing rather than appearing spontaneously along the border. Between January 2023 and August 2024, some 813,000 migrants were admitted through Mexico via CBP One appointments [1]. The share of unauthorized migrants processed at southwest border ports of entry rose from 4 percent in FY 2021 to 17 percent in FY 2023 as these systems scaled up [1].
At the same time, the administration used its parole authority more expansively than predecessors. A program for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (the CHNV parole program) authorized up to 30,000 admissions per month for those meeting specific conditions; by early 2024, nearly 530,000 people had entered via nationality‑specific parole pathways, and about 297,000 had used CHNV alone through November 2023 [1][2]. Migration Policy Institute estimates that by July 2024, over 5.8 million migrants had been paroled into the country or otherwise allowed entry to pursue asylum, other protection claims, or immigration cases [2]. For some nationalities—Haitians in particular—evidence suggests these avenues redirected would‑be irregular crossers into more controlled processes [1].
These same programs are read very differently across the political spectrum. MPI and similar analysts portray them as managed pathways designed to reduce dangerous journeys and bring flows under more formal control [1][2]. A November 2024 House Judiciary staff report, by contrast, describes CHNV as a “fraud‑ridden, unmitigated disaster” that allegedly let “hundreds of thousands” bypass standard border statistics and vetting [3][6]. DHS itself later referred to aspects of CHNV as a problematic “scheme” to be unwound [3]. This divergence illustrates how identical flows—people paroled into the United States—can be cited either as proof of an “open border” or as evidence of a system attempting to channel migration into legal, trackable forms.
While these “carrots” expanded access for those who complied with new procedures, the administration simultaneously introduced “sticks” that significantly narrowed traditional asylum routes. During Biden’s early tenure, the public-health expulsion authority known as Title 42 remained central: in March 2022, 51 percent of encounters still ended in rapid expulsion under this mechanism, down from more than 80 percent under Trump but still very high [4]. Because Title 42 expulsions often resulted in immediate returns without formal removal orders, they encouraged repeat crossing attempts and mechanically inflated encounter counts, weakening any simple mapping between “encounters” and distinct individuals [4][5]. This statistical distortion complicates direct comparisons across administrations and undermines claims that raw encounter totals alone demonstrate a uniquely permissive regime.
When the administration lifted Title 42 in May 2023, it paired that move with the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule, a major new restriction. Under this rule, most migrants who crossed irregularly and had not used CBP One or sought and been denied asylum in a transit country were presumed ineligible for asylum, absent “exceptionally compelling circumstances” [1][2]. The rule made expedited removal more likely and was deliberately designed to funnel migration into designated channels and deter unregulated arrivals. Civil liberties advocates challenged it in court as a de facto revival of Trump‑era bans on asylum for border crossers [1][2].
Other enforcement steps further undermined the notion of a legal “open border.” DHS reported roughly 700,000 removals and returns in FY 2024, the highest level since 2010 and including record removals to countries beyond Mexico [2]. A June 5 proclamation tightened asylum access between ports of entry; following its implementation, DHS tripled the share of noncitizens processed via expedited removal and reduced Border Patrol releases pending court proceedings by 89 percent [2]. These changes coincided with reported declines in estimated “gotaways” of about 60 percent from FY 2023 to FY 2024 [2]. Additional measures—expanded expedited removal, deployment of more troops to the border, and a June 2024 executive order that effectively shut down asylum access once daily crossings exceeded a specified threshold—were associated with crossings dropping back to 2020 levels [6]. Meanwhile, one empirical study found that arrests, detentions, and removals increased in Biden’s early period relative to late Trump, characterizing the “border crisis” as a phenomenon that predated Biden and diminished before his term ended [2][5].
The resulting system is best understood as a tightening gate rather than an open one. On one side, the scale of legal admissions through CBP One and parole, together with operational overcrowding and visible strains on local communities, fed powerful public and political impressions that the border had been thrown open. On the other, the underlying legal regime for irregular crossers was hardened by presumptive asylum ineligibility, expanded expedited removals, continued aggressive use of Title 42 well into Biden’s term, and threshold‑based shutdowns of asylum processing between ports. Instead of ceasing enforcement, the administration re‑engineered it: irregular border crossers who failed to use approved channels faced higher barriers and faster removals, while those who could navigate the new digital and bureaucratic infrastructure were more likely to be processed into the country.
These policy choices interacted with external conditions and information networks. High labor demand and the spread of digital communication magnified the effects of policy signals—both official and rhetorical. Migrants and smugglers interpreted announcements about parole programs, reduced interior enforcement priorities, or public criticism of “open borders” in ways that shaped expectations and timing. At the same time, congressional and advocacy narratives selectively emphasized either the scale of arrivals and releases or the scale of removals and restrictions, using the same underlying data to argue either that Biden engineered a border crisis or that he inherited and then tried to manage a regional migration shock.
Taken together, the evidence does not support a literal “open border” in the sense of unfettered entry or abandoned enforcement. It instead points to a complex regime in which expanded legal pathways and record encounter numbers coexisted with rising removals, new legal barriers to asylum, and a concerted attempt to move migration out of irregular channels and into regulated ones. Whether this architecture “caused” an influx of undocumented immigrants depends on how one weighs policy‑driven channel shifts against powerful economic and informational forces that were already propelling people toward the U.S. border.
Conclusion
Taken together, the evidence does not support a literal “open border” under the Biden administration, but rather a consciously re-engineered system that combined expanded lawful pathways with significant new constraints on irregular entry. Legal mechanisms such as CBP One and CHNV parole redirected large numbers into controlled channels, even as rules like Circumvention of Lawful Pathways and expanded expedited removals tightened asylum access and boosted returns. Record encounters reflected Title 42 distortions, hemispheric pressures, and U.S. labor demand as much as policy shifts. The “open border” label thus functions more as political shorthand than an accurate description of a complex, highly managed border regime.
Sources
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_policy_of_the_Biden_administration
[2] https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/biden-immigration-legacy
[3] https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-04-16-How-the-Biden-Administration’s-Lax-Immigration-Enforcement-Allows-Dangerous-Criminal-Aliens-to-Run-Free-in-American-C.pdf
[4] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/04/27/key-facts-about-title-42-the-pandemic-policy-that-has-reshaped-immigration-enforcement-at-u-s-mexico-border/
[5] https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-01-18-new-data-reveal-worsening-magnitude-of-the-biden-border-crisis-and-lack-of-interior-immigration-enforcement.pdf
[6] https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/biden-three-immigration-record
[7] https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-december-2024-monthly-update
[8] https://www.dhs.gov/2025
[9] https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/rising-border-encounters-in-2021/
[10] https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-didnt-cause-border-crisis-part-1-summary
[11] https://oversight.house.gov/release/wrap-up-biden-administrations-policies-have-fueled-worst-border-crisis-in-u-s-history/
[12] https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/117905/witnesses/HHRG-119-HM11-Wstate-RiesL-20250325.pdf
[13] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexico–United_States_border
[14] https://www.heritage.org/border-security/report/the-biden-administration-has-brought-additional-67-million-illegal-aliens
[15] https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/rising-border-encounters-in-2021/
[16] https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-11-20 The Biden Harris Administration’s CHNV Parole Program Two Years Later – A Fraud-Ridden%2C Unmitigated Disaster.pdf
Written by the Spirit of ’76 AI Research Assistant
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